White papers from Dataplane.org, research our team has written or contributed to, and shorter findings from the newsletter.
Practical guides for operators on protecting commonly attacked services, plus reference material we keep up to date with help from the community.
A reference list of the default ephemeral port ranges and source port selection strategies used by a variety of systems. Corrections and additions from the community are welcome.
Read analysisSSH is one of the most targeted services on the Internet. This white paper helps operators review their SSH configuration and the countermeasures available to protect their systems.
Read analysisMany VNC deployments are open to session hijacking and password guessing. This white paper covers VNC configuration and countermeasures to help protect this entry point.
Read analysisIndustry and academia both measure DDoS attacks, but with different vantage points and methods. This paper compares their data sets and finds where the views agree and where they differ.
Papers, RFCs, and standards work written or co-written by the Dataplane.org team.
Complete publication list at dataplane.org/jtk/publications/
Shorter write-ups from the newsletter about things that showed up in our data.
123456 was tried more than 41 million times. Volume dipped mid-year and surged again in Q4, and one odd string, nPSpP4PBW0, suddenly ranked eighth in September. Plus the ten most common unsolicited DNS queries.
Read in newsletterStarting in August 2023, DNS queries arrived with source addresses forged to an address next to the target. We describe the queries, how we kept them out of our feeds, and how IP TTL values from many sensors pointed to an origin in East Asia.
Read investigationPasswords tried in 2023 ranged from 1 to 358 characters with a median of eight, and 123456 stayed on top. Our unadvertised web sensors saw almost no traffic for the Apache Struts CVE-2023-50164 exploit, which was an insight of a sort.
Read newsletterIntroducing dnstypename, the DNS queries seen across many sensors. Plus the most common HELO/EHLO strings and MAIL FROM addresses sent to sensors that were never advertised as mail servers.
Our RPKI publication point sees most of the world's relying party clients. We count clients still running old releases, including RIPE NCC Validator installs a year after support ended.
Read newsletterAround October 6, 2021, SSH activity dropped suddenly across sensors worldwide, and other monitors saw the same thing. We found no takedown or software change that explains it. Also, an early look at our RPKI relying party measurements.
Read newsletterDataplane.org has roots in academia, and we've supported university projects with data and with passive and active measurements from our vantage points. If you need help measuring the Internet at global scale, or you've published work that uses our Signals, please tell us. It helps us decide what to build next.
Citation guidance
When citing our data, name Dataplane.org, the Signal or Signals you used, and the dates the data covers.
Dataplane.org NFP. "[name] Signal."
https://dataplane.org/signals/[name].txt
Accessed [date range].
# Example:
Dataplane.org NFP. "sshpwauth Signal."
https://dataplane.org/signals/sshpwauth.txt
Accessed January–December 2025.
The sensors, the Signals, and the time spent on analysis are paid for by donations and commercial users. If our research helps you, please consider a donation.